wolsey Alexander Litvinenko Before this report came out I was sceptical that anything would change, but after reading it I'm now a lot more positive. The tone says that they're serious - and I'm sure the PL will deploy all of their money and tame media to fight this tooth and nail.
But at the very least I think some of the recommendations will be implemented, if only as a damage limitation exercise by the PL, so the game will be better off after it than it is now - for instance getting rid of FCR and providing proper funding for supporters' organisations and supporter representation.
A line in the sand has been drawn and now everyone knows where they are - it's been spelt out clear as day that the FA has to be independent of the PL rather than its puppet.
The full report is here :
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmcumeds/509/509.pdf if anyone wants to read the full 143 pages.
My ignorance of the details is stunning, but what exactly can the Government do?
Key recommendations and summaries are below. A lot of it is about governance and ownership structures, but there's nothing in these that isn't good for readers of this thread :
1. While recognising that some progress has been made by agreement among the football authorities, we were disappointed that there was less progress than we had hoped in key areas. We go on to consider the details of the authorities’ proposals in the rest of this Report. We urge the authorities to be more radical and more urgent in addressing the problems faced by the game because of the weaknesses in its governance structure, at both FA and club level. We recommend that, unless there has been clear progress in all the areas we highlight below within 12 months, the Government introduce legislation as soon as practicable. (Paragraph 18)
2. We welcome the move to require all committees to report to the FA’s Main Board; however, there is still the potential for the Board to become marginalised. (Paragraph 27)
3. As the governing body of football in England, the Football Association should take the lead in decision-making for the game. Although the joint proposals include more consultation of representative groups by the National Game Board (NGB) and Professional Game Board (PGB), both these Boards will still, effectively, be dominated by the Premier League which provides funding directly or indirectly to the national game and the other leagues. Since the FA Main Board will be acting on the recommendations of the National Game Board and Professional Game Board, it is inevitable that, under these proposals, the Premier League will retain its dominance over the Football Association. Arguably, by devolving decision-making downwards, the joint proposals in some respects reinforce that dominance. While it is inevitable that the paymaster will have far greater influence than the other bodies in a representative organisation like the FA, we are disappointed that the proposals have not sought to alter this balance of power. (Paragraph 28)
4. The Core Group proposals of 27 June 2012 set out categories of decisions, some of which are for the FA Board and some of which are for delegation to the National Game Board and Professional Game Board. We are concerned that a number of key decision areas have been delegated from the FA to the NGB and PGB, with the regulator in effect ceding power to the regulated. It is also a matter of concern that the National and Professional Game Boards—largely composed of vested interests from the top of the football pyramid—will have the power to decide whether or not new areas requiring regulation would fall under the sole purview of the Football Association. (Paragraph 29)
5. We are not convinced that the governance of football is made easier or more effective by the requirements for consensus and the active consent of the regulated bodies to individual changes of the rules. (Paragraph 30)
6. In addition, we consider that clubs must incorporate changes, once agreed, into their rules to ensure that individual clubs follow the agreed procedures consistently and transparently. Paragraph 31)
7. Altogether, while the football authorities’ joint proposals make some progress in tackling the confusing overlap of roles within football governance, they fail to address the fundamental issue that the FA should exercise responsibility for all issues of major significance to the game through its Main Board and Council. (Paragraph 32)
8. The failure of the Football Association to reduce the size of its Board to ten is disappointing and largely due to the unwillingness of the leagues to reduce their representation. The representative balance of the Football Association Board is an even more pressing issue than its size, however. In order to allow the Football Association to become a strategic body—able to assert itself over the Leagues where appropriate—we recommended a Board structure that put Football Association executives and non-executives in the majority (6:4) over the vested interests of the Professional Game and National Game. Though the Football Authorities’ response accepted that the Board should be smaller, it failed to implement changes to composition which would put vested interests in the minority. Under the joint proposals, therefore, the FA Board would remain an association of interests. (Paragraph 36)
9. We are not convinced by the contention of the Football League that they require more than one representative in order to be able to operate effectively without delaying Board decisions. We recommend that the number of representatives from the leagues be limited to one each. (Paragraph 37)
10. We consider that the Professional Game Board is still very unrepresentative of the diversity of interests within the game. We recommend that the Board should contain wider representation, especially of supporters. (Paragraph 50)
11. The Football Authorities must produce more detailed proposals for the involvement and consultation of supporters and supporters’ groups through its committees and working groups. (Paragraph 51)
12. The Government undertook to investigate the possibility of amending the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 to protect minority supporter stakes in the case of a compulsory purchase order. The Government should state whether it intends to amend the Act and, if not, should set out its reasons. (Paragraph 54)
13. The delay in implementing the Government’s proposed expert working group—for which Supporters Direct has produced a draft agenda and which has been welcomed by the football authorities—runs counter to the Government’s commitment to remove barriers to supporter ownership. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport should set up the working group before the start of the new season. The working group should develop practical approaches to the difficulties faced by supporter ownership schemes including problems raising money, obtaining shares and defending against compulsory purchase orders. (Paragraph 59)
14. The resources dedicated to investigating fully the owners of clubs differ between the leagues, with the Premier League able to invest more in procedures and specialist assistance. At present the Premier League is confident that it knows the identity of the ultimate owners of its clubs, while the Football League is less certain who its clubs’ ultimate owners are, relying only on information provided by the clubs themselves which is checked against records in the public domain. Neither League is willing to provide the information it holds to fans. (Paragraph 66)
15. The Football Association Regulatory Authority should set a common standard across all English clubs for a percentage of ownership of a club which would trigger mandatory disclosure. We remain unconvinced that the ultimate owners of football clubs—which are not ordinary businesses and operate for the enjoyment and benefit of their local communities and fans—require their anonymity to be preserved either from or by the football authorities. The current situation, which denies fans the right to know who owns their club, is highly unsatisfactory. We recommend that the Premier League and Football League should have the duty to provide evidence to the Football Association of the identities of the ultimate owners of their clubs and that
the Football Association should make information about the ultimate owners of each club publicly available. (Paragraph 67)
16. We welcome the fact that the football authorities’ response accepted the need for a licensing model; however, the proposed system fails to provide the FA Board with the clear responsibility and powers to make it work effectively. The FA should produce a detailed proposal for a club licensing system including the composition of the FA Regulatory Authority (FARA). The FA Board should be responsible for decisions about the content and operation of the licensing system advised by, but not dependent on, agreement from the NGB and PGB. (Paragraph 74)
17. We are encouraged by recent significant progress by clubs towards adopting the Financial Fair Play framework introduced by UEFA. However, we remain concerned about the levels of debt within the game. We see little evidence that clubs will spend significant amounts of the funding available from the latest broadcasting rights settlement on increasing their sustainability rather than on players’ salaries and transfers. We await with interest clubs’ spending plans for the next season. We expect the Financial Fair Play rules to be enforced. If they are not enforced, then we consider that legislation will be required to impose some financial discipline on clubs. (Paragraph 84)
18. A significant source of debt for football clubs is the money paid to other clubs in player transfer fees. Teams are currently able to spend huge amounts on buying players because other clubs are willing to allow them to enter into long-term payment agreements. Clubs are arguably willing to do this because they do not see it as a financial risk because the Football Creditors Rule (FCR) gives them preferred creditor status. The short-term effect of removing the FCR may well be to cause some clubs to suffer financially from the insolvencies of clubs which owe them
money. However, in the longer term, clubs would be encouraged to require each other to demonstrate that they could afford the full cost of player transfers, which in turn has the potential to lead to more modest transfer fees being demanded. (Paragraph 93)
19. The Football Creditors Rule protects the interests of often highly-paid footballers and other clubs at the expense of HMRC and the many small local businesses which supply clubs with services and equipment and which make up the majority of unsecured creditors. Despite the admission by the football authorities that there is no moral defence for the rule, they have failed to develop an alternative. The football authorities must explore other ways of reducing the chances of insolvency such as the greater use of clauses in players’ contracts allowing clubs to pay them reduced salaries in the event of the team being relegated. We recommend that the Government legislate to ban the use of the Football Creditors Rule at the earliest opportunity. (Paragraph 94)
20. Parachute payments play a part in the financial organisation of the leagues. However, their impact on—especially lower league—clubs needs to be examined by the FA Board in order to determine the appropriate level at which payments should be made to ensure that they cause the least disruption possible and do not incentivise financial risk-taking. (Paragraph 98)
21. The joint response does not address the Committee’s recommendation to abolish the 50:50 divide of FA surplus revenues between the National Game Board and Professional Game Board. We remain of the view that the FA should be allowed to give a larger share of the surplus revenue to the national game if it wishes, as this has fewer sources of revenue. (Paragraph 103)
22. While we recognise that genuine efforts have been made and some progress has been achieved in relation to supporter representation and ownership, we are disappointed with the lack of direction and urgency from the football authorities as well as the Government. Not enough has been done to ensure a consistent and positive approach by clubs to active supporter involvement and meaningful consultation. Although the requirement for all clubs to appoint a Supporter Liaison Officer is clearly a step in the right direction, the football authorities should set out in more
detail how both formal and informal consultation of fans and supporters’ groups must be conducted and how this would be funded. The degree of supporter engagement should not be left to individual clubs, as it is now. The Football Association should require that, as part of a new licensing model, clubs have the responsibility to engage constructively with supporters, and the FA should draw up a set of best practices for clubs to ensure proper consultation and involvement of supporters. The new licence should also include a requirement for clubs to provide supporters’ trusts with the club’s financial reports. (Paragraph 111)
23. The football authorities’ response failed to identify a long-term funding strategy for Supporters Direct. The FA and the Premier League should agree and implement an effective long term funding solution for Supporters Direct by the end of March 2013, following the solidarity discussions due to take place in January. (Paragraph 117)
24. The existing powers of the Independent Football Ombudsman to address complaints against leagues and clubs are unsatisfactory, particularly in light of the Football League’s own inability to enforce judgments on its clubs. We recommend that the Independent Football Ombudsman should be given the power to enforce its adjudications after upholding complaints against the leagues and their clubs. (Paragraph 120)
